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This paper examines the interactions between household formation, inequal-
ity, and per capita income. We develop a model in which agents decide to become
skilled or unskilled and form households. We show that the equilibrium sorting of
spouses by skill type (their correlation in skills) is an increasing function of the
skill premium. In the absence of perfect capital markets, the economy can con-
verge to different steady states, depending upon initial conditions. The degree of
marital sorting and wage inequality is positively correlated across steady states
and negatively correlated with per capita income. We use household surveys from
34 countries to construct several measures of the skill premium and of the degree
of correlation of spouses’ education (marital sorting). For all our measures, we find
a positive and significant relationship between the two variables. We also find
that sorting and per capita GDP are negatively correlated and that greater
discrimination against women leads to more sorting, in line with the predictions
of our model.
I. INTRODUCTION
With a few notable exceptions, the analysis of household
formation has played a relatively minor role in macroeconomics.
The vast majority of macroeconomic models tend to assume the
existence of infinitely lived agents (with no offspring) or a dynas-
tic formulation of a parent with children.1 While this may be a
useful simplification for understanding a large range of phenom-
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1. Even Becker and Tomes’ [1979, 1986] pioneering work on intergenera-
tional transmission of inequality assumes a one-parent household.
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ena, it can also lead to the neglect of potentially important inter-
actions between the family and the macroeconomy. This is espe-
cially likely to be the case in those areas in which intergenera-
tional transmission plays a critical role, as in human capital
accumulation, income distribution, and growth.
The objective of this paper is to examine how household
formation (“marriage”), inequality, and per capita output may
interact in an economy. The main idea that we wish to explore,
theoretically and empirically, is the potentially reinforcing rela-
tionship between the strength of assortative matching and the
degree of inequality. In particular, we want to examine the thesis
that greater inequality may tend to make matches between dif-
ferent classes of individuals less likely, as the cost of “marrying
down” increases. In an economy in which borrowing constraints
can limit the ability of individuals to acquire optimal levels of
education, this private decision of whom to marry may have
important social consequences. In particular, it can lead to inef-
ficiently low aggregate levels of human capital accumulation and
thus higher wage inequality and lower per capita income. Thus,
inequality and marital sorting are two endogenously determined
variables that potentially reinforce one another.
To explore the ideas sketched above, we develop a model in
which individuals obtain utility both from household consump-
tion and from the match-specific quality of their partner. Individ-
uals are either skilled or unskilled, according to education deci-
sions made when young. Once education is completed, there is a
matching process in which individuals have opportunities to form
households. When a skilled individual meets an unskilled indi-
vidual with high match quality (love), there will be a trade-off
between forming a household with relatively lower consumption
but high match quality and continuing the search for a match.
Once a household is formed, individuals have children. The latter,
in turn, must again decide whether to invest in skills or not.
Becoming a skilled (or, equivalently, educated) agent is costly. To
finance education, young individuals need to borrow in an imper-
fect capital market in which parental income plays the role of
collateral. Thus, parental income as well as the net return to
being a skilled versus an unskilled worker, including the expected
utility from one’s future match, determine the proportion of chil-
dren who on aggregate become skilled.
We show that the steady state to which this economy con-
verges will in general depend upon initial conditions. In particu-
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lar, it is possible to have steady states with a high degree of
sorting (skilled agents form households predominantly with oth-
ers who are skilled; unskilled form households predominantly
with unskilled), high inequality, and low per capita income. Al-
ternatively, there can be steady states with a low degree of
sorting, low inequality, and high per capita income. We also
extend the model to incorporate gender discrimination and exam-
ine an alternative search model that generates multiple equilib-
ria. We show that it is likely that societies with more gender
discrimination will also have greater sorting, as women will tend
to marry more for money than for love.
Our empirical analysis examines the main implication of our
model: a positive correlation between the skill premium and
marital sorting. To do this, we assemble a total of 34 country
household surveys from the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) and
the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) and use them to
construct a sample of households for each country. From these
samples we construct several measures of the skill premium as
well as a measure of marital sorting—the correlation of spouses’
years of education. For all our measures of the skill premium, we
find a positive and significant relationship with marital sorting,
even after controlling for other possible sources for this correla-
tion, such as urbanization and ethnic fractionalization. Further-
more, we show that marital sorting and per capita income are
negatively correlated across countries. We also explore the effect
of gender discrimination and find, as predicted by our model, that
greater gender discrimination is associated with more sorting.
Our work can be seen as integrating two literatures. A first,
rapidly growing, literature is concerned with the intergenera-
tional transmission of inequality in models with borrowing con-
straints. These models, though, either assume a dynastic formu-
lation (e.g., Becker and Tomes [1986], Loury [1981], Ljungqvist
[1993], Galor and Zeira [1993], Ferna´ndez and Rogerson [1998],
Be´nabou [1996], Dahan and Tsiddon [1998], Durlauf [1995],
Owen and Weil [1998], Knowles [1999], Kremer and Chen [1999],
and De La Croix and Doepke [2003]), or consider a two-parent
household in which the degree of sorting is exogenously specified
(e.g., Kremer [1997] and Ferna´ndez and Rogerson [2001]). The
last two papers are particularly relevant as they are concerned
with whether an (exogenous) increase in marital sorting can lead
to a quantitatively significant increase in inequality. In our
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model, on the other hand, sorting and inequality are endoge-
nously determined.
The second literature focuses on the determinants of who
matches with whom, but basically abstracts from the endogeneity
of the income distribution in the economy. The seminal paper in
this literature is Becker [1973] and more recent contributions
include Cole, Mailath, and Postlewaite [1992] and Burdett and
Coles [1997, 2001]. Hess [2004] is a recent paper that analyzes,
both theoretically and empirically, how the desire for income
insurance affects the duration of marriage.2
Our paper, therefore, can be seen as trying to integrate both
literatures in a simple, analytical framework. Some recent work
that also shares our concerns, but that is more focused on fertil-
ity, marriage, and divorce, are Aiyagari, Greenwood, Guner
[2000], Greenwood, Guner, and Knowles [2003], and Regalia and
Rı´os-Rull [1999]. The models, not surprisingly, are more compli-
cated and rely on computation to obtain solutions for particular
parameter values.
Last, there is a small empirical literature that is related to
our work. As reviewed by Lam [1988], the general finding in the
literature is the existence of positive assortative matching across
spouses. Mare [1991] documents the correlation between spouses’
schooling in the United States since the 1930s. Using a large
cross section of countries, Smits, Ultee, and Lammers [1998] find
that the relation between marital sorting and some indicators for
development (such as per capita energy consumption and the
proportion of the labor force not in agriculture) has an inverted-U
shape. Dahan and Gaviria [1999] report a positive relation be-
tween inequality and marital sorting for Latin American coun-
tries. Boulier and Rosenzweig [1984] document assortative
matching with respect to schooling and sensitivity to marriage
market variables using data from the Philippines. Finally, Gould
and Paserman [2003] examine the effect of male inequality on
female marriage rates. They show that higher male inequality in
a city is associated with lower marriage rate of women, a finding
that they interpret as resulting from women searching longer for
mates in cities with higher wage inequality.
Our paper is organized as follows. The second section pre-
2. Laitner [1979], on the other hand, endogenizes bequests (but not labor
earnings) and hence the income distribution. He assumes, however, that matches
are randomly determined. See Bergstrom [1997] and Weiss [1997] for a survey of
the literature on theories of the family and household formation.
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sents a dynamic model of endogenous matching and inequality
and explores different variants of the matching model. The third
section examines the empirical evidence, considers alternative
candidates for the basic results, and explores causality. The last
section concludes.
II. THE MODEL
We assume that the economy is populated by overlapping
generations who live for three periods. At the beginning of the
first period, young agents decide whether to become skilled or
unskilled. Once educated, they meet in what we call a “household
matching market.” Here they find another agent with whom to
form a household, observing both the agent’s skill type (and hence
are able to infer that agent’s future income) and a match-specific
quality. In the second period, the now adult agents have children,
work, and pay their education debt (if any). In the last period,
households consume their income net of debt repayment and act
as monitors to ensure that their children repay their education
debts.
II.A. A Simple Model of Marital Sorting
We start by describing the matching problem faced by
agents. The choice of whom to match with is, of course, driven by
many factors: tastes, environment (e.g., who interacts with whom
and the distribution of characteristics of individuals), and the
prospects for one’s material and emotional well-being. The simple
model we develop below allows all these factors to interact to
produce a household. To focus on the main features of our analy-
sis—the interplay between inequality and household forma-
tion—we simplify in various dimensions. In particular, we as-
sume that the two adult agents in a household share a common
joint utility function, and we abstract from any differences be-
tween women and men, either exogenous (e.g., childbearing
costs), or cultural and institutional (e.g., the degree of wage
discrimination or the expected role of woman in the home relative
to the workplace).3 We discuss the implications of allowing men
and women to differ in subsection II.C.
An agent is assumed to derive utility from consumption in
3. For models that focus on intrafamily bargaining problems, see, for exam-
ple, Bergstrom [1997] and Weiss [1997].
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the last period of life and from the quality of her match. Assuming
that an agent is in a household (we will ensure later that this is
the case), the indirect utility function for a couple with match
quality q and household income I is given by
(1) VI, q  uI  q,
where u is a continuous and strictly increasing function of I.
Individuals are either skilled (s) or unskilled (u). If skilled,
they earn wages ws in the second period and, in the third period
after repaying their education debt, have net income w˜s  ws 
d to contribute to the household, where d is the (constant) mone-
tary cost of becoming skilled. Unskilled agents earn wu in the
second period, and this is the income they contribute to the
household in the third period.
Wages are the outcomes of competitive labor markets for
both factors of production—skilled and unskilled workers. The
economy produces a single aggregate consumption good with
constant returns to scale technology using skilled and unskilled
workers. Thus, given a decomposition of the labor force L into
skilled or unskilled workers (L  Ls  Lu), and denoting by  the
proportion of skilled workers in the population, full employment
and constant returns to scale imply that output is given by
FLs, Lu  LF, 1    LuF 1   , 1  Lu fk,
where k  /(1  ). Hence wages depend only on :
(2) ws fk and wu  f k f kk.
Note that w˜s is decreasing in , wu is increasing in , and thus
that the skill premium is a decreasing function of the proportion
of skilled workers.
Households can be categorized by the skill types of its two
partners. Let Iij denote the net household income for a couple
composed by skill types i, j  {s,u}. Thus,
(3) Iij  2w˜s, if ij ssw˜s wu, if ij su
2wu, if ij uu.
We assume that in the first period, once their education
decisions have been made, agents have two opportunities to
match and form a household. In the first round, all agents meet
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randomly and draw a random match-specific quality q. This
match can be accepted by both agents resulting in a “marriage” or
rejected by at least one of the agents whereupon both agents
enter the second round of matching. In the second round, agents
are matched only with their own skill group and draw a new
random match quality. We assume that qualities are match-
specific i.i.d. draws from the same continuous cumulative distri-
bution function Q (with its pdf denoted by Q), and with expected
value 	 and support [0,q ]. An agent who remains single obtains
utility only from her own income. Thus, the assumption of q  0
is sufficient to ensure that all agents form a two-agent household
in the second round.4
To solve the matching problem faced by agents, note first that
since a skilled agent’s second-round option dominates that of an
unskilled agent (given w˜s  wu—a necessary condition in order
for any individual to choose to become a skilled worker), the
skilled agent will determine whether a match between a skilled
and an unskilled agent is accepted in the first round. In particu-
lar, a skilled agent who encounters an unskilled agent in the first
round and draws a high q will face a trade-off between forming a
lower-income household with a high quality match, or waiting an
additional period and forming a higher-income household with
another skilled agent but with an expected quality level equal to
	; i.e., this agent faces a trade-off between love and money.
Letting Vij(q)  u(Iij)  q, note that a skilled agent is
indifferent between accepting a first-round match with an un-
skilled agent and rejecting that match and proceeding to the
second round if Vsu(q)  Vss(	). Solving for the level of q at
which this occurs, q*, yields a threshold quality of
(4) q*  u2w˜s  uw˜s wu  	.
The intuition underlying (4) is clear. The expected quality differ-
ential in the matches, q*  	, must compensate for the loss in
utility in matching with a lower income agent; i.e., u(2w˜s) 
u(w˜s  wu). Of course, the threshold quality for two agents of the
same type to match in the first round is 	 as this is the expected
4. Although unrealistic, this allows us to abstract from the issue of how
inequality affects the decision to remain single, which is not the focus of the
analysis here. This is for simplicity only, as is the assumption that match quality
is drawn from a distribution that is independent of the types. In our comparative
static analysis, we will assume that q is sufficiently large so that in equilibrium
some matches occur between skilled and unskilled individuals.
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value of next round’s match quality and there is no difference in
household income.
Now that we have solved for the threshold qualities at which
different households form, given a distribution of individuals into
skilled and unskilled at time t, t, we can find the equilibrium
distribution of household types. The equilibrium distribution of
households of each type depends only on the probability of meet-
ing in the first round and on q*. Both of these are only a function
of t since this variable determines both household incomes and
first-round matching probabilities.
Denoting by 
ij the proportion of households formed between
agents of skill types i and j, i, j  {s,u} with 
su  
us, the
equilibrium distribution of households is given by
(5) 
ijt   t2  t1 tQq*t, if ij ss2t1 t1Qq*t, if ij su
1 t2  t1 tQq*t, if ij uu.
Each line in (5) is obtained by calculating the probability that in
the first round types i and j meet, multiplying it by the proportion
of those types of meetings that will be accepted and, if i  j,
adding the matches that occur in the second round. For example,
meetings between a skilled and an unskilled agent occur with
probability 2t(1  t) in the first round, and are accepted with
probability 1  Q(q*), with no additional matches between these
two types in the second round.
It is important to note that Q(q*) measures the degree of
marital sorting in this economy. If individuals were not picky and
simply matched with whomever they met in the first round, then
q* would equal zero, and 
su would equal the probability of a
skilled and an unskilled individual meeting, i.e., 2t(1  t). If
individuals only cared about match quality and not about income,
then q* would equal 	. Last, if individuals cared only about
income and not about match quality, then Q(q*) would equal one,
and there would be no matches between skilled and unskilled
agents.
As shown below, Q(q*) is the correlation coefficient between
skill types of spouses across households. This is most easily seen
by setting Q equal to zero or one in (5) and noting that in the first
case the distribution of households would be the same as that
generated by purely random matching (and hence would have a
zero correlation), whereas in the second case there would be
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perfectly assortative matching (i.e., no mixed couples and a cor-
relation equal to one).
LEMMA 1. Q(q*) is the correlation between skill types of spouses
across households.
Proof of Lemma 1. Let X be the random variable associated
with the skill distribution of “women” (i.e., x  1 if x  s, and x 
0 if x  u). Similarly, let Y be the random variable associated
with the skill distribution of “men.” Note that 	x  	y  , x 
y  ((1  ))
1/ 2, and that E(XY)  
ss. Recalling that the
correlation coefficient 
  (E(XY)  	x	y)/xy yields 
 
Q(q*).
The observation above will be very useful when we examine
the data as although the proportions of matches of each type that
form may have ambiguous comparative statics with respect to 
(as we discuss below), this is not true for the degree of sorting (i.e.,
for the correlation coefficient).
II.B. Sorting and Inequality
Key to our analysis is the effect of greater inequality on
household formation. We start by analyzing how sorting is af-
fected by an exogenous increase in inequality, e.g., technological
change that increases w˜s relative to wu. Taking the appropriate
derivatives of q* in (4) yields
(6)
q*
w˜s
 2uIss  uIsu,
q*
wu
 uIsu 0,
and thus, whereas an increase in the unskilled wage unambigu-
ously decreases q* and therefore decreases sorting, the effect of
an increase in the skilled wage depends on the degree of concavity
of the utility function. Henceforth we assume that the latter is not
too concave, i.e., that A1 below holds:
(A1) 2u2x  ux.
Note that A1 is a sufficient condition for q*/w˜s  0 and that it
holds for a variety of utility functions such as linear, log, and
more generally, for CRRA with   1.
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THEOREM 1. An increase in the skill premium, ws/wu, increases
marital sorting.
Proof of Theorem 1. Recall that the degree of sorting is given
by Q(q*). Noting that Iss  Isu, it follows from A1 and (6) that q*,
and hence sorting, increases with the skill premium.
The theorem above implies that an exogenous increase in
inequality increases sorting by making skilled workers less will-
ing to form households with unskilled workers. We now turn to
examining the effect of a change in .
Unlike an exogenous increase in the skill premium, a change
in  affects not only the return to being a skilled or an unskilled
worker through its effect on wages, but also directly affects the
probability of a skilled and an unskilled worker meeting by
changing the distribution of agents. Thus, even if agents did not
change their sorting behavior, a change in  would alter the
equilibrium distribution of households. The correlation coefficient
is extremely useful as a measure of sorting since it takes into
account that the underlying distribution of agents has changed.
Consequently, although as we will see below a change in  has
potentially ambiguous consequences for changes in the equilib-
rium distribution of households, its implications for the degree of
marital sorting are unambiguous.
COROLLARY 1. A decrease in  increases marital sorting.
Proof of Corollary 1. To determine the effect of a change in 
on marital sorting, we need to determine only the sign of dq*/d.
Note that dw˜s/d  f (dk/d)  0, dwu/d  f k(dk/d)  0,
where dk/d  1/(1  )2. It follows immediately from Theorem
1 above that dq*/d  0 and hence that a decrease in  increases
marital sorting.
The intuition for the result above is that a decrease in 
increases the skill premium and thus makes skilled workers less
willing to form matches with unskilled workers. One might ask,
however, how does a change in proportion of skilled workers in
the population affect the fraction of households of each type? An
increase in  will unambiguously decrease the fraction of couples
who are uu as, for any given q* they are less likely to end up in
uu households. Furthermore, the effect on wages implies that q*
will decrease, thereby increasing the probability that a first round
match between a high and low skilled worker results in a house-
hold. The effect on us and ss households, on the other hand, is
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ambiguous (although the aggregate fraction of the population
that is in one of these two types of households must, of course,
increase). For any given q*, the fraction of ss households in-
creases, but as a skilled individual is now more willing to match
with an unskilled one, this will work to decrease the fraction of ss
households. The effect on us households is positive if   1⁄2 (as
both the likelihood of s and u individuals meeting in the first
round and the probability that the match will be accepted in-
crease) and ambiguous otherwise. This ambiguity is not trou-
bling, however, as the theory leads to unambiguous results with
respect to sorting—the focus of our empirical analysis. It also
indicates why studying correlations (rather than proportions of
types) is important, as the former does not depend on the distri-
bution of agents, except endogenously.
As the analysis above indicates,  is the key variable in our
model. It determines wages, sorting, and the equilibrium distri-
bution of households. Before turning to an analysis of how  is
itself determined in the model, it is useful to clarify the role of
some of the simplifying assumptions in our model and discuss
how they contribute to our results.
A useful feature of our matching model is that, in any given
period,  only affects the degree of sorting through its effect on the
skill premium (since that is what determines q*). This is due to
the way in which we modeled the rounds of search: only two
rounds and the second round with one’s own type. A more general
model of matching would have the proportion of individuals of
different types in the matching market evolve endogenously as a
result of matches made in previous rounds. This would then
produce a dependence of the correlation on the initial fraction of
skilled individuals, independently of the latter’s effect on the skill
premium. In general, however, this type of search model with
nontransferable utility also generates multiple equilibria.5 In
Appendix 1 we develop an alternative model of matching in which
the degree of sorting is no longer independent of . Although this
alternative model can give rise to multiple equilibria, for all
locally stable equilibria this model nonetheless generates the
same qualitative relationships between sorting, inequality, and 
as in our original simpler specification. Our results, therefore, do
not require a very specific matching structure but rather one in
which, in response to an increase in , the increased incentive for
5. See Burdett and Coles [1997].
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a skilled individual to match with an unskilled one due to the now
lower wage differential is stronger than the increased incentive to
search longer for the now relatively more abundant skilled part-
ner. Our simpler matching model highlights only the first force
since it assumes that a skilled individual can always match with
another one by rejecting a first-period match. Our alternative
model allows both forces to work and obtains similar results, but
at the cost of multiple equilibria. In our empirical work we ex-
amine the effect of both  and of inequality on sorting.
Another key feature of our matching model is that it is
essentially genderless; there are only skilled and unskilled agents
(or alternatively, equal numbers of skilled males and females and
equal numbers of unskilled males and females, and both sexes’
market earnings depend only on their skill type). The cost of this
simplification is that it does not allow us to analyze questions
about gender discrimination. We next turn to a more complicated
model that permits an exploration of some of these issues before
returning to our simpler model for the dynamic analysis.
II.C. Sorting and Gender
Our model in essence has only one gender. This enormously
simplifies the analysis since it allows us to deal with only two
groups—skilled and unskilled—rather than the four that would
result if we further differentiated our agents into females and
males. An interesting question, therefore, about which our simple
model is unable to shed any light is how discrimination against
women may affect the trade-off between love and money, i.e.,
sorting.6 Although doing full justice to this question would re-
quire us to significantly modify our model and the main focus of
our analysis (earnings inequality and sorting) and thus deserves
an independent paper, we think that it is nonetheless illuminat-
ing to attempt to examine how two factors—female wages and the
ease with which women work outside the home—may affect sort-
ing. Below we present a partial analysis.
Consider an economy with two genders and, as before, two
skill levels. Agents are endowed with a unit of time. Men spend
their entire unit of time working in the market whereas women
decide how much time to devote to raising their children and how
6. We thank Alberto Alesina for suggesting that we explore the implications
of discrimination for sorting.
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much time to spend in the formal labor market. Time spent
raising children contributes to the quality of the latter.
The household utility function is given by
(7) Uwmi, wfj  ln wmi wfjtj  ln 1 tjj,
where   1, and i, j  {s,u} indicate the skill type of the agent,
m and f denote male and female, respectively, tj is the amount of
time a woman of type j spends in the formal labor market, and
(1  tj)j is the quality of the child that results if a woman of type
j spends 1  tj units of time raising the child.
7 Note that wages
are indexed by sex as well as skill type.
The first-order condition for tj is given by
(8)
wfj
wmi wfj
 
1
1  tj
   0,
with
  0, tj 0, tj 0.
Hence,
(9) tj  wfj wmiwfj1   , if wfj  wmi
0, otherwise.
Thus, the amount of time a woman spends working outside the
home is increasing in her own wage and decreasing in the wage of
her partner.
We assume that matching takes place over two rounds, both
at random. Agents who decide to marry in the first round do not
participate in the second. Hence, as before, a skilled agent who
meets an unskilled agent in the first round and draws a high q
will have to decide between accepting that match or going on to
the next round where the expected quality of the matches is given
by 	, but where there is also a positive probability that another
skilled agent will be met and thus that household income will be
greater.
7. This formulation assumes that the quality of the child depends only on the
skill level of the female and the amount of time she devotes to raising it. A more
general specification would allow both spouses to determine the quality of the
child and allow men to also choose how much time to devote to child rearing.
Assuming that men have a comparative advantage in market work then yields
similar results (i.e., men work in the formal labor market, and women are either
housewives or spend some time in each activity), but requires more algebra.
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Now that we differentiate between men and women, it also
makes sense to allow the perceived quality of a match to differ
across both potential spouses, otherwise, if a man of type i and a
woman of type j meet, the same gender-type would always be
decisive in accepting the match for all meetings between these
two gender-types. Hence the utility from a match is now given by
U(wmi,wfj)  qmi for the man and by U(wmi,wfj)  qfj for the
woman, where qmi and qfj are (perhaps correlated) draws from a
distribution Q.
To examine some of the possible effects of discrimination
against women, a first interesting exercise is to compare the
relative “pickiness” of skilled women in two societies that share
the same parameters but differ in the wages that they pay skilled
women (e.g., wage discrimination).8 Thus, consider the choice of a
skilled female who has met an unskilled male in the first round
and must decide whether to match with him or to proceed instead
to the second round in which she faces a probability  of obtain-
ing a match with a skilled male and a probability 1   of
matching with an unskilled male. Assume that wfs  ws, so that
skilled women spend at least some of their time in the formal
labor market.
The cutoff level of love required for a woman not to want to
continue her search is given by equating her payoff from marry-
ing this unskilled male (U(wmu, wfs)  q*fs) to the expected value
of the match from the second period (U(wms, wfs)  	) 
(1  )(U(wmu, wfs)  	), yielding
(10) q*fs 	  Uwms, wfs  Uwmu, wfs
 	   1   ln wms wfswmu wfs,
where we have made use of (9) to obtain the household utilities.
It is straightforward to show that q*fs/wfs  0, i.e., skilled
women who live in a society in which, ceteris paribus, they earn
higher wages will favor “love” over money by more than similar
women who live in a society in which their work is compensated
at a lower rate. The intuition for this is clear: in a society in which
skilled women are less well compensated, they will value on the
margin more the additional income of a higher paid spouse.
8. See Galor and Weil [1996] for a model in which exogenous differences
between women and men lead to a large wage gap at low levels of capital, which
is then reduced as capital accumulates.
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Hence, ceteris paribus, we might expect to see more sorting in
societies in which skilled women are paid less.9
We next compare the effect of participating actively in the
formal labor market on women’s marital choices. Women may
work less in one society than in another because of low wages,
discriminatory hiring, or social norms. To avoid unnecessary al-
gebra, we examine two extreme societies: one in which females
choose their work time freely (and wfs  wms) and one in which
they do not work outside the home; all other parameters are
assumed to have the same values in both societies. As before, we
consider the choice faced by a skilled woman who has met an
unskilled man in the first round and must decide whether to form
a household or to proceed to the second round in which the
probability in which she meets a skilled man is given by . We
will show that when women are free to work outside the house,
ceteris paribus, they will favor love over money by more than
women who are restricted to being housewives.
Letting a tilde denote the value of a variable when a woman
does not work outside the home, after some algebra we obtain
(11) q*fs q˜*fs  1   ln wms wfswmu wfs ln wmswmu,
so that if women are less picky in a society in which they work,
q*fs  q˜*fs should be negative. This is shown below, establishing
that skilled women who are able to work freely are more inclined
to choose love over money than women who can only work at
home.
PROPOSITION 1. q*fs  q˜*fs  0.
Proof of Proposition 1. See Appendix 2.
The analysis above gives an indication that there may be
greater marital sorting in societies in which there is more em-
ployment discrimination against women whether this occurs
through wages, through a lower probability of finding a job, or
through social norms that make it more difficult for women to be
employed in the formal labor market. The analysis is incomplete,
however, as we confined our derivation to comparing the choices
of skilled women who have a given probability of meeting a
skilled man in the second round. This probability, however, is
9. Note that while we are attributing the lower wages of women to discrimi-
nation, these could be instead the effect of different technologies.
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itself endogenous and depends, as well, on how men perceive the
trade-off between skilled and unskilled women in both societies.
In Appendix 2 we show results from numerical simulations of this
model that lead to a similar conclusion for a range of parameters.
We now return to our simple genderless model to analyze the
dynamic evolution of the economy.
II.D. Education Choice
We assume that households have nij children in their second
period of life, and for simplicity, treat this as an exogenous and
continuous variable with nss  nsu  nuu.
10 Young agents make
their education decisions in the first period. Becoming a skilled
agent is costly; it requires an expenditure of d which young
agents must borrow and later repay in the second period. The
relative attractiveness of being a skilled worker depends both on
net wages and on the expected return to matching. The expected
utility from being a skilled worker given that a fraction t1 of
the population also becomes skilled is given by
(12) Vst1  t1 
0
q
max Vssx; t1, Vss	; t1 dQx
 1 t1 
0
q
max Vsux; t1, Vss	; t1 dQx,
whereas the expected utility of being an unskilled worker is
(13)
Vut1  t1
0
q*
Vuu	; t1 dQx  
q*
q
Vsux; t1 dQx
 1  t1 
0
q
max Vuux; t1, Vuu	; t1 dQx.
We assume that in addition to a monetary cost of d, becom-
ing a skilled worker entails an additive nonpecuniary cost of
10. See the working paper version of this paper [Ferna´ndez, Guner, and
Knowles 2001] for an analysis with endogenous fertility.
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 [0,].11 This cost can be thought of as effort, and it is assumed
to be identically and independently distributed across all young
agents with cumulative distribution function . Thus, an agent
with idiosyncratic cost i will desire to become skilled if V
s 
Vu  i.
We define by *() the skilled-unskilled payoff difference
generated when a fraction  of the population is skilled; i.e.,
(14) *t1  Vst1  Vut1.
Note that given *, all agents with i  * would want to become
skilled.
Let us first consider what would happen if all agents were
able to borrow freely. Note that in this case, contingent on their
value of i, young agents would make the same decision irrespec-
tive of their parents’ household type. Hence in equilibrium a
fraction (*) of each family would become skilled yielding t1 
(*). In order for this to be a rational expectations equilibrium,
it must be the case that
(15) **  Vs*  Vu*.
However, if parental income is a factor that influences a
child’s access to capital markets (either in terms of the interest
rate faced or in determining whether they are rationed in the
amount they are able to borrow), then children of different house-
hold types may make different education decisions although they
have the same i. In this case, the fraction of children of different
household types that become skilled will depend on the parental
household income distribution, and thus on t.
12
In particular, we assume that children within a family with
household income I can borrow on aggregate up to Z(I), Z  0.
One way to think about this constraint is that parents can act as
monitoring devices for their children in an incentive-compatible
fashion by putting their own income up for collateral (in period 2
11. This assumption simply ensures that not all unconstrained agents will
want to become skilled, and thus allows the skill premium to vary with the
severity of borrowing constraints.
12. It is important to note that this constraint should not be interpreted
literally as the inability to borrow freely to, for example, attend college. It could
also reflect parental inability to borrow against their children’s future human
capital so as to live in a neighborhood in which the quality of primary and
secondary public education is high or to opt out of public education for a high-
quality private education. It is the quality of this earlier education that then
determines the probability of an individual attending college even if the latter is
free.
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of their lives). This ensures that the children will use the funds to
become educated rather than for consumption. Hence, a family
with income I and n children can at most afford to educate at a
cost d per child a fraction (ˆ(I,n)) of their children, where
(ˆ(I,n)) is implicitly defined by13
(16)
ZI
nˆI,n
 d.
Note that, as indicated in (16), children from families with low
household income are hampered in their ability to become skilled
because of the lower aggregate amount that can be borrowed.14
Thus, given t (and hence family income), in equilibrium a
proportion
(17) ijt, t1  min *t1, ˆIijt, nij
of each family type become skilled, yielding in aggregate
(18) t1
ij ijt, t1nij
ijt
ij nij
ijt
,
where the numerator (times Lt) gives the number of skilled
individuals at time t  1 and the denominator (times Lt) gives
the population at time t  1.
II.E. Equilibrium
An equilibrium is a sequence {t}t1
 such that (i) given t, a
skilled and unskilled wage pair (ws(t), wu(t)), a threshold
match quality (between skilled and unskilled agents) q*(t), and
a distribution of households 
ij(t) are determined by (2), (4), and
(5), respectively, for all t  1; (ii) {t}t1
 satisfies (18) where
the fraction of children from each family type becoming skilled
ij(t, t1) is determined by (17), and threshold nonpecuniary
cost levels * and ˆ are given by (14), and (16), respectively.
Figure I depicts the equilibrium t1 generated by a given t.
The upward-sloping line,   (t1; t), is derived in the
following fashion. For a given t, it gives the value of  such that
the proportion of young individuals who both have i   and are
13. We are implicitly normalizing the gross interest rate to equal one. Note
that as we are not endogenizing the supply of funds for loans, it is best to think of
loans being provided on a world market (in which this country is small).
14. If lower-income households have more children than higher-income
households, this constraint is even more binding.
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able to borrow to pay the cost of becoming skilled equals t1. As
 increases, so does the proportion of the population with i  
and so t1 must increase. Note that the domain of this function
in general may be smaller than 1 since, if not all individuals are
able to borrow, then t1 will be below one even if  3 . In the
absence of borrowing constraints, (t1; t) does not depend on
t and its inverse equals (). Note that the unconstrained 
curve is the lower envelope of the family of curves parameterized
by different values of t since for a given , the proportion of
agents with i   that can afford to become skilled is highest in
the absence of borrowing constraints.
The downward-sloping curve shows *(t1)  V
s(t1) 
Vu(t1) as a function of t1. Note that this curve does not
depend on t. The intersection of the two curves gives the equi-
librium pair (**,*t*1) for a given t.
Existence of an interior equilibrium (for any initial t) is
guaranteed if we assume that w˜s()  wu() for some   (0,1)
(i.e., there exists  such that for any  greater than it, no one
wishes to become skilled) and that for some other   (0,1) the
inequality is reversed.15 Note that the  curve is continuous,
upward sloping, starts at zero, and becomes vertical once all
household types are constrained. Thus, this and the fact the
15. This is guaranteed, for example, by imposing Inada conditions on the
production function.
FIGURE I
Equilibrium Determination of t1
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*(t1) is a continuous function defined over the entire range of
[0,1] and goes from strictly positive to strictly negative numbers,
guarantees the existence of an interior equilibrium.
Uniqueness of equilibrium (for any given t) is guaranteed if
* is monotonically decreasing in . This may not be the case,
however, as an increase in  also increases the probability of
meeting a skilled agent. The resulting potential ambiguity is
discussed in Appendix 3 in further detail. Hereafter we simply
assume that16
(A2)
d*
d  0,
as this type of potential multiplicity is not the focus of our
analysis.
II.F. Steady State
The state variable is the proportion of skilled agents in the
economy, t. The dynamic evolution of this variable is given by
equation (18). A steady state is defined as a t  * such that
t1(*)  *. Note that if  is constant, so are wages, and so is
the cutoff quality for a skilled agent to match with an unskilled
agent and the education decisions of children.
If the economy had perfect capital markets, then indepen-
dently of the initial value of , the ability of individuals to borrow
would imply that a proportion ˜  (˜) of them will choose to
become skilled, i.e., ij  ˜, @ij, @t such that *(˜)  ˜. Thus,
the economy would converge immediately to the unique steady
state.
In the absence of perfect capital markets, the initial distri-
bution of individuals into skilled and unskilled determines the
dynamic evolution of the economy. With borrowing constraints,
for those household types who are constrained, a proportion
smaller than (*) will be able to become skilled. Aggregating
over all family types, therefore, a proportion smaller than (*)
will become skilled next period. Obviously, the first family type to
be constrained will be the uu type, followed by the us type, and
last by the ss type, as lower family income implies both more
binding borrowing constraints and a larger number of children
who wish to borrow.
16. Simulation of the model for various functional forms and parameter
values always resulted in a unique equilibrium.
292 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
As shown in Figure II for a particular CES production func-
tion, this economy can easily give rise to multiple steady states,
here given by the intersections of t1 with the 45 degree line.
17
As depicted in the figure, the steady states A and C are locally
stable.18 The steady state in A is characterized by a low propor-
tion of skilled individuals, high inequality between skilled and
unskilled workers, and a high degree of sorting in household
formation (i.e., skilled individuals predominantly marry other
skilled ones; unskilled individuals predominantly marry other
unskilled). In the steady state C, the opposite is the case: there is
a large fraction of skilled individuals, low inequality, and low
sorting.
Across steady states and indeed across any equilibrium at a
point in time, higher inequality is associated with higher sorting.
17. The functional forms used to generate this figure are a production func-
tion given by F(Ls,Lu)  (Ls
  (1  ) Lu
)1/, and a limit on aggregate
borrowing by children within a family of a fraction  of household income; i.e.,
Z(I)  I. Last, we assume that  is distributed uniformly and that q is distrib-
uted with a triangular density function. The parameter values used are  
0.25,   0.5,   0.1,   0.2, q  10, d  0.1, and nss  1, nsu  2, and
nuu  4.
18. Note that the number of locally stable steady states can be greater than
two since this depends on the change in the fraction of children of different family
types that are constrained at different values of .
FIGURE II
An Example with Multiple Steady States
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This follows simply from the static analysis in which we showed
that greater wage differentials imply greater sorting (Theorem 1).
We now turn to our empirical analysis in which we investigate
whether this positive relationship between sorting and inequality
holds.19
III. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
Our model predicts that countries with higher skill premi-
ums should have higher degrees of household sorting. This rela-
tionship should hold independently of whether countries have the
same technology or whether they are converging to the same or
different steady states. Indeed, this positive association follows
from the static part of our theoretical analysis, in which greater
inequality in the incomes of skilled relative to unskilled individ-
uals causes the former to reject a higher proportion of potential
matches with unskilled individuals.20 Furthermore, across
steady states, the relationship between sorting and inequality is
mutually reinforcing. That is, higher degrees of household sorting
should be associated with higher skill premiums and vice versa.
The purpose of this section is to investigate the relationship
between marital sorting and the skill premium across countries.
To our knowledge, this is the first paper that has attempted to
study the interaction of these variables in a systematic fashion for
a relatively heterogeneous set of countries.21 We examine the
main implications of our model using household surveys from 34
countries in various regions of the world. For each country, we
assemble a sample of households with measures of the education
and earnings of both spouses, and construct several measures of
19. One might also ask whether economies that start out with greater in-
equality necessarily end up in a steady state with at least as much inequality (and
sorting) than an economy that starts out with lower inequality. We have shown
this to be so for a large number of simulations, but it is potentially ambiguous
since the proportion of households that are type su first increases and then
decreases with  which implies that t1 may have a range in which it is a
decreasing function of t. This does not, however, affect the prediction which we
will examine in the data: the existence of a positive correlation between sorting
and the skill premium.
20. One can think of the initial source of variation in the skill premium as
arising from different initial conditions or, more generally, from country-level
shocks with no serial correlation across generations. Under these assumptions,
the initial-conditions problem discussed in Heckman [1981], does not arise.
21. See Dahan and Gaviria [2001] for descriptive evidence on the positive
correlation between marital sorting and inequality for Latin American countries.
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the skill premium and a measure of the correlation of education
between spouses (marital sorting).
We find a positive and significant relation between the skill
premium and marital sorting across countries. We show that the
relationship is robust to alternative specifications of the model, to
alternative measures of the skill premium and sorting, and to
various concerns regarding heterogeneity in the way the data are
reported across countries. We examine other candidate explana-
tions for this positive correlation and attempt to establish cau-
sality. We also investigate the effect of gender discrimination and
find that, as in our model, lower discrimination is associated with
less sorting. Our model also predicts that, for countries with
similar technologies, marital sorting and GDP per capita should
be negatively correlated, which we also show to be so in the data.
Altogether, we take our findings as providing agreement of our
basic hypotheses with the data.
III.A. The Sample
The data consist of twenty household surveys assembled
from the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) and thirteen Latin-
American (LA) household surveys. In addition, we include the
British Household Panel Study (1997).22 These surveys were
carried out by the governments of each country, and so a major
issue for our analysis is ensuring that variables are comparable
across countries. The LIS countries are largely European, but
also include Australia, Canada, Israel, Taiwan, and the United
States.23 The years of these surveys range from 1990 to 1996,
while LA surveys date from 1996–1997. We provide a more de-
tailed discussion of these household surveys in Appendix 4, where
we also list the names, coverage, and sample sizes of the surveys
by country.
The way we select our sample varies somewhat with the
variable we are measuring. To measure sorting, for each country
we first construct a sample of couples where the husband is
between 36 to 45 years old.24 We do not restrict the definition of
22. We use the BHPS rather than the data from the LIS because the LIS
reports education for Britain as the age at which an individual completes her
education, a variable that is hard to map into years of schooling.
23. Education and earnings data for Russia are also available in the LIS, but
the low quality of the data resulted in negative estimates of the skill premium. As
a result we exclude it from our sample.
24. We restrict our attention to this age group for our measure of sorting,
since younger cohorts presumably are less stable regarding their marriage pat-
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a spouse to legally married couples, but for convenience we refer
to them as “wives” and “husbands.” We include households in this
sample of couples, if, in addition to various age requirements,
there is a spouse present and education variables are available
for both spouses.
To calculate skill premium measures, we construct a sample
of husbands from a wider age group than 36 to 45, since presum-
ably what individuals care about is some measure of the lifetime
income of their spouses rather than earnings at a particular point
of the life cycle (the age requirements are reported in the variable
section that follows). We include husbands in the sample for our
skill premium calculations, if, in addition to age requirements,
there is a spouse present and husbands’ wages are nonmissing
(including zeros). For both sorting and skill-premium calcula-
tions, we restrict the sample to single-family households and to
those with male household heads. Observations are weighted
using the household weights provided by the country survey.
II.B. Variables
We use labor income from all sources as our measure of the
return to education. The exact definition of reported income dif-
fers by country. Some LIS countries report gross annual labor
earnings, all forms of cash wage and salary income, and some
report these net of taxes, which is closer in spirit to earnings in
the model. The Latin American surveys report gross monthly
labor income from all sources. The fact that some countries report
gross income while others report net income could distort our
cross-country comparisons, as net income will be more equally
distributed than gross income in those countries with progressive
taxation. We discuss our attempt to deal with this problem later
on in the paper. Appendix 4 provides the details of our income
measures.
We construct four measures of the skill (education) premium
for each country. Three of the measures rely on a definition of a
skilled individual. We define individuals as skilled if they have
more years of education than those required to complete high
terns. Ideally we would want to examine a population for which we could observe
both marital decisions and the expectations of lifetime wage inequality at the time
of the marriage decision. The latter consideration argues for younger rather than
older cohorts since presumably the observed wage inequality corresponds more
closely to the expected one than is the case for older individuals.
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school, creating a skill-indicator variable that equals one if an
individual is skilled and equals zero otherwise. The fourth defi-
nition requires knowing an individual’s years of education.
Education measures also differ across countries. Almost all
LIS countries report education in terms of levels, rather than
years, and often these levels are stated in terms of the nation’s
education system, so some standardization is required.25 The
Latin American data also required standardization because the
number of years required for high-school completion varies across
countries. For countries that report attainment together with
years of schooling, our skill indicator equals one if some postsec-
ondary education was reported for an individual. For countries
that do not report attainment level, our skill-indicator equals one
if the years of schooling exceeded the standard time required to
complete high school in that country. The mapping of reported
education measures into years of schooling and into an indicator
for high school completion is summarized in Table XIV in Appen-
dix 4.
Our four measures of the skill premium are defined as fol-
lows. The first is the ratio of earnings for skilled male workers to
unskilled ones in our sorting sample, i.e., husbands between ages
36 and 45.26 This measure is very simple and intuitive, and has a
direct counterpart in our model. A potential drawback of using
the wage ratio as described above is that it reflects income at a
particular stage in the life cycle, and the mapping from this
variable to lifetime income is likely to differ across skill groups. It
also ignores information other than education that could also
affect earnings, such as age or labor market experience. We
control for such effects by constructing another measure of the
skill premium; this is the coefficient on an indicator for being
skilled (i.e., having at least some post-high-school education) in
the following regression:
log ei a0  a1Ii  a2age si  6 a3age si  62  εi,
where ei is earnings, Ii is an indicator for being skilled, si is years
of schooling, and (age  si  6) is potential experience for
individual i. This regression is estimated for each country by OLS
25. Furthermore, while most countries report the highest level of education
undertaken, Italy reports only the highest level completed.
26. We focus primarily on the male skill premium as women’s labor supply
decision is more likely to depend on her spouse’s earnings. This is discussed more
at length farther on in the paper.
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for all husbands aged 30–60 who have positive earnings rather
than solely for those aged 36–45. Given that we have controlled
for experience, this measure may be able to better capture poten-
tial lifetime labor earnings inequality than the simple ratio of
earnings for our smaller sample.27 We will refer to this measure
as the skill indicator measure of inequality and to the previous
one as the wage ratio measure of inequality. These two measures
will differ as the skill indicator uses a larger sample, omits
zero-earnings and controls for experience.
Although these two measures of the skill premium have clear
counterparts in our model and hence are easy to interpret, both of
these measures depend on our definition of being skilled. Since
this definition, i.e., going beyond high school, can be considered
rather arbitrary we also use a measure that does not depend on
this threshold—the Mincer coefficient. The Mincer coefficient is
the coefficient b1 on years of schooling, si, in the following
regression:
log ei b0  b1si  b2age si  6 b3age si  62  εi.
We estimate this regression for all husbands aged 30–60 in our
samples, as we did with our skill indicator measure.
Finally, note that our analysis so far has been based on
inequality in annual incomes. A better measure, were it avail-
able, would be that in expected lifetime incomes, as presumably
that is what an individual cares about when making a trade-off
between quality and income across matches. In the absence of
panel data, we cannot observe lifetime labor incomes. We can,
however, construct crude estimates based on the standard “syn-
thetic cohort” method [Ghez and Becker 1975]. We create projec-
tions of lifetime income using observations on older cohorts to
predict the future income of the young. Our simplest measure
does this by dividing the life cycle into five-year intervals, from
25–30 up to 60–65, and then computing average labor income
over five-year intervals for skilled and unskilled individuals sepa-
rately. We take the present value of the predicted income profiles
as the measure of lifetime labor income assuming an annual
discount factor of 0.96.28 The ratio of these lifetime-income mea-
27. How good this measure is of lifetime labor earnings inequality depends on
how well the earnings of different cohorts at a point in time represents the
life-cycle earnings of an individual (i.e., on the stability of the earnings profile).
28. We exclude higher ages because some of the age-country-skill cells are
empty for particular countries.
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sures for skilled relative to unskilled workers constitutes our
fourth measure of the skill premium, which we call the lifetime
income measure.29
Our measure of sorting is the Pearson correlation coefficient
between husband’s and wife’s years of education across couples in
our sample. Note that we use education rather than income (in
our model the two are synonymous). We follow this strategy
because in reality a female’s labor force participation decision is
often dependent on her spouse’s earnings and social norms. Note
that, as shown in our section on sorting and gender, as long as
skilled women produce higher quality children than their un-
skilled counterparts, men will still want to marry more educated
women.
Table I reports the measures of the skill premium and mari-
tal sorting for each country. The first column gives, for each
country, the means and standard deviation for the proportion of
skilled men (those with more than high school) in our 36–45
years old husbands sample. The sample mean across countries is
around 25 percent with a standard deviation of 12.5 percent. The
next four columns report means and standard deviations, by
country, of the different skill premium measures. The sample
mean across countries of both the wage ratio and of the lifetime
income ratio is around 2 with a standard deviation close to 0.8 for
the wage ratio and 1 for the lifetime income ratio. The same
statistics are 0.63 with a standard deviation of 0.30 for the skill
indicator measure and 0.09 with a standard deviation of 0.03 for
the Mincer coefficient. The countries with the lowest skill premi-
ums are Australia (wage ratio and the Mincer coefficient), Nor-
way (wage ratio), and Denmark (Mincer coefficient), while Colom-
bia and Brazil (wage ratio) and Paraguay (Mincer coefficient)
have the highest skill premiums. As shown in Table II, these four
29. As a further robustness check, we also compute an analogous measure of
lifetime income that controls for age variation within cohorts. We estimate the
following equation on husbands aged between 30 and 60 years:
log yit 0  1age si  6 2age si  62  εi,
where yit is earnings, si is years of schooling, and (age  si  6) is years of
potential experience. We estimate this separately for each skill group. We then
compute the present value of predicted earnings over this age range, discounted
back to age 30 using an annual discount factor of 0.96 for each educational class,
and as before, take the ratio of skilled to unskilled earnings as the measure of
lifetime labor income inequality. This measure is highly correlated with the first
measure (the correlation coefficient is about 0.94).
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measures of the skill premium are highly correlated with each
other.
The sixth column in Table I reports the correlation measure
of marital sorting. The correlation ranges from 0.322 for Austra-
lia to 0.764 for Colombia. On average, across countries the corre-
lation between spouses’ years of schooling is around 0.60 with a
standard deviation of 0.11.
As a check, we can compare our calculation of the percentage
of skilled men with similar calculations performed by others.
Barro and Lee [2000] provide a data set on educational attain-
ments for a large set of countries. The correlation across countries
between the proportion of skilled males in our sample and pro-
portion of men aged 25 and over with postsecondary education in
Barro and Lee is 0.85.30 If we do not restrict our sample to
husbands, we also obtain 0.85 for the correlation. Another check
comes from the OECD [2002] which reports the proportion of men
between the ages of 35 and 44 with at least tertiary (postsecond-
ary) educational attainments in 2001. Again the correlation
across countries between the two samples is very high, 0.87 (and
30. Based on 31 countries, since the data for Czech Republic, Luxembourg,
and Slovakia are not available in Barro and Lee [2000].
TABLE II
CROSS-COUNTRY CORRELATIONS
Skill premium
Marital sorting
Pearson corr.
coef.
Wage
ratio
Skill
indicator
Mincer
coef.
Lifetime
ratio
Skill premium
Wage ratio 1.000
Skill indicator 0.966 1.000
(0.000)
Mincer coef. 0.842 0.861 1.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Lifetime ratio 0.928 0.934 0.810 1.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Marital sorting
Pearson corr.
coef. 0.636 0.684 0.651 0.626 1.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Significance levels are shown in parentheses.
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0.84 if we do not restrict our sample of men to husbands).31 These
results leave us confident that our measures of the male skilled
population is consistent with available estimates that are com-
monly used in the literature.
We can also compare our skill premium estimates with those
reported by other studies. Szekely and Hilgert [2000] estimate
the Gini index for hourly wages for 15 to 65 year old males for a
large set of countries. Although this is not the measure of inequal-
ity that we are using, the correlation between the Gini index for
hourly wages and our skill premium measures are quite high:
between .76 and .79 depending on our skill premium measure.32
Another study is Bils and Klenow [2000], who provide a collection
of Mincer coefficient estimates. The correlation between our
Mincer coefficient estimates is around .6, which is quite high
considering that they are using a large variety of sources and a
wide range of years—from 1970 for Britain to 1990 for Denmark,
Peru, and Spain.33 Thus, our skill premium estimates are also in
line with available estimates.
III.C. Results
This subsection reports the main results of our empirical
analysis and conducts several robustness checks.
Note first from Table II that marital sorting is positively and
significantly correlated with all our measures of the skill pre-
mium (between 0.6 and 0.7 in each case). Table III reports the
results of our baseline regressions of marital sorting on the skill
premium, for all measures of the latter. We find that the rela-
tionship is positive and significant at the 1 percent level for all
measures of the skill premium (the standard errors of the OLS
regression are based on the Eicker-White robust covariance ma-
trix in order to correct for heteroskedasticity). While the coeffi-
cients on the skill premium vary with the definition used, it is
interesting to note that they all imply that an increase in skill
premium by one standard deviation is associated with an increase
31. Based on 20 countries: Australia, Belgium, Britain, Canada, Czech
Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, German, Hungary, Italy, Luxembourg,
Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, and the United
States.
32. Szekely and Hilgert’s [2000] estimates are based on household surveys
from 1994–1997. The correlations are based on 28 countries. The Gini index is not
available for Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Israel, Slovakia, and Spain.
33. Based on 26 countries, since estimates for Belgium, Czech Republic,
Finland, France, Luxembourg, Norway, Slovakia, and Taiwan are not available in
Bils and Klenow [2000].
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in sorting of around .06 to .07, i.e., around 60 to 70 percent of one
standard deviation of marital sorting. Thus, variation in the skill
premium can be associated with a large fraction of the variation
in marital sorting. The implied elasticity is between 0.25 and
0.32, depending on the skill premium concept used. We conclude
that our baseline empirical test agrees with the basic prediction
of our theory: a positive, statistically significant, economically
strong relationship between the skill premium and marital
sorting.
Figures III and IV show the data used in the regressions of
Table III for the wage ratio and the Mincer coefficient measures
of the skill premium (pictures with the skill indicator and lifetime
income ratio measures are similar). As is clear from these figures,
Latin American countries tend to have a greater degree of in-
equality and marital sorting than the rest of our sample. One
possible interpretation of this finding is that Latin American
countries are in a steady state with high inequality and high
sorting, whereas the rest of our sample (predominantly European
countries) are in a low inequality-low sorting steady state with
the variation within these subsamples being explained by coun-
try-specific factors (e.g., labor-market institutions, education and
FIGURE III
Inequality (Wage Ratio) and Marital Sorting
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tax policy, credit markets, etc.). To make sure that our results are
not driven by some factor that is common to Latin American
countries, specification 2 in Table III introduces a Latin American
dummy variable. The results from this specification show that the
skill premium is still significant at the 1 percent level, suggesting
that the correlation between sorting and inequality is not driven
by some difference between the LA countries and the rest of the
sample.34
To further explore whether there is something different
about the Latin American countries that may also be responsible
for our results, we reran our basic regression for our LA and LIS
subsamples separately. Despite the significantly reduced sample
sizes, the relationship between sorting and the skill premium
remains positive and significant in each subsample in Table IV. It
is interesting to note that the magnitude of the relationship
doubles or triples for the LIS subsample for almost all specifica-
tions. The standard deviation of the skill premium is significantly
smaller, however, for the LIS subsample. Consequently, a one-
34. We also checked for outliers that shifted the estimated coefficient on the
skill premium by more than one standard deviation; there were no such outliers.
FIGURE IV
Inequality (Mincer Coefficient) and Marital Sorting
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standard-deviation increase in the skill premium is associated
with an increase of between .4 and .5 of a standard deviation in
marital sorting in the LIS sample and with an increase of be-
tween .5 and .6 of a standard deviation in marital sorting in the
LA sample.35
We performed several other robustness checks. Since our
model is silent about single men, we recalculated the skill pre-
miums using all men (married and single), with the appropriate
age restrictions, for each measure. Our results are very similar to
the ones obtained for husbands, and they are reported in the
second panel of Tables III and IV.
We also investigated whether the way in which variables are
reported may significantly affect our results. As noted previously,
some countries report earnings net of taxes and some report gross
earnings. Since, due to progressive taxation, gross earnings will
in general tend to be more unequal than the net ones, this can
create differences in the measured skill premium and affect our
results. In order to control for the way income is reported, we
introduce a dummy variable that takes a value of one if the
country reports net earnings and zero otherwise. As can be seen
in Table V, the interaction of this dummy with the skill premium
is positive and (with one exception) significant. Thus, an increase
in the skill premium has a larger effect, not surprisingly, for those
countries in which earnings are reported net of taxes since when
individuals compare alternatives they should care about the af-
ter-tax household income of their potential partners rather than
their gross income.36
How education is reported also varies across countries. As we
noted previously, some LIS countries report years of education
whereas others report only the highest formal level attained, such
as high-school diploma or undergraduate degree. As a result, for
some countries the years of education or skilled category includes
only those who have completed college or the appropriate degree
and excludes those who have not obtained the pertinent degree
but may have progressed beyond high school. In order to check
whether this feature of our data affects our results, we ran our
35. The standard deviation of sorting is 0.1 and .06, respectively, in the LIS
and LA samples. The standard deviations of the inequality measures are given by
.19 (.75) for wage ratio, .11 (.27) for skill indicator, .02 (.03) for Mincer, and .26
(.96) for lifetime ratio, with values for LA in parentheses.
36. We also reran our regressions using Szekely and Hilgert’s estimate of the
Gini index for hourly wages. This had a positive and significant effect on sorting,
both with and without a LA dummy.
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regressions including a dummy variable that takes the value of
one for countries which report the finer classifications of educa-
tion and zero otherwise. This variable was not significant, and it
did not affect the results. We also attempted to correct for errors
introduced by erroneous mapping of education attainment cate-
gories to years of education and for the use of high school as a
perhaps arbitrary dividing line between skilled and unskilled by
weighing each country’s estimate of the skill indicator and Mincer
coefficient by the inverse of the square of standard deviations of
the estimate. This alternative also yielded similar results.
Last, a related concern is that although we studied each
country’s education system to understand how it progresses, the
actual number of years of schooling that we assign to each attain-
ment level may affect our measure of marital sorting. A possible
check is to use the Spearman rank correlation between years of
schooling of husbands and wives as an alternative measure of
sorting as this is a purely ordinal measure. The Spearman rank
correlation and Pearson correlation measures of sorting are
highly correlated (0.98). Not surprisingly, we obtain similar re-
sults as in Tables III and IV as can be seen in the second panel of
Table V.
Before investigating whether our results are driven by some
third variable, it is useful to repeat our basic regressions but this
time control as well for the proportion of the sample of husbands
who are skilled, i.e., control for t. Recall that, although in our
basic model the effect of the skill premium on marital sorting is
independent of the proportion of the population that is skilled,
this would not be the case in a variety of alternative matching
models (for example, the one developed in Appendix 1). The last
panel of Table V reports the results from this regression. In all
specifications, the effect of t is negative, although significant
only for the Mincer measure of the skill premium. In all cases, the
effect of the skill premium on sorting is positive and significant,
at the 1 percent level without a Latin American dummy, and at 1
or 5 percent with it.37
We conclude that our results hold for our entire sample of
countries and within the LIS and LA subsamples separately, and
furthermore they are robust to a series of measurement issues.
We next turn to the issue of causality.
37. We also controlled for a quadratic relationship in t with similar results.
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III.D. Causality
In our model both the current skill premium and marital
sorting are endogenously determined variables. Marital sorting
(Q(q*)) is determined by the current skill premium. The latter,
on the other hand, is not determined by sorting. Rather, the
current skill premium is a function of the proportion of individ-
uals who decided to become skilled earlier (t), i.e., of education
decisions that precede any decision about whom to marry. Sorting
instead affects next generation’s skill premium (i.e., t1) since it,
along with the skill premium, determines the proportion of next
generation’s population who will become skilled. In terms of our
analysis, this means that the skill premium faced by our sample
of 35–45 years-old married men is not simultaneously deter-
mined with their sorting patterns. Rather, the skill premium is
the outcome of decisions made a couple of decades ago when this
generation was making its education decisions.
The argument above indicates that causality runs from the
expected skill premium to sorting. It could be argued, however,
that technology shocks that affect the skill premium tend to be
serially correlated. If technology shocks are neutral and the pro-
duction function is constant returns to scale, however, then a
measure such as the wage ratio will not be affected by these
shocks. On the other hand, if shocks are not neutral, then this
concern is valid since there will be a bias in the coefficient esti-
mate resulting from the correlation of the explanatory variable
with the error term. To correct for this endogeneity bias, we
would like to find a variable that is highly correlated with the
explanatory variable but not with the error term in the regression
equation.
Ex ante, an excellent candidate as an instrument for the skill
premium is the amount of capital per worker, since presumably
this variable is positively correlated with the skill premium (if
capital and skilled labor are more complementary than capital
and unskilled labor), and there is no reason to believe that it
would have an independent effect on the degree of marital sort-
ing. We attempted to use both capital per worker from the Penn
World Tables developed by Heston, Summers, and Aten [2002],
and investment in machinery as a percentage of GDP from Flug
and Hercowitz [2000] to instrument for the skill premium. In both
cases, the measures were unable to capture sufficient variation
across countries beyond those between countries from Latin
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America and the LIS sample; i.e., they did not survive the inclu-
sion of a Latin American dummy.
As an alternative, we also explored using labor union
strength as an instrument, since the latter could affect the skill
premium but should not have any direct effect on marital sorting.
We used total trade union membership as a percentage of the
total labor force (union density) and workers covered by collective
bargaining as a percentage of total salaried workers as two dif-
ferent proxies for union strength (both of these measures are from
Rama and Artecona [2000]). As an instrument, however, these
measures had the same problem as capital per worker and in-
vestment in machinery. While the strength of labor unions for the
1990–1994 period is negatively and significantly correlated with
our skill premium measures, the significant relation disappears
once we control for Latin America.38 Consequently, we decided to
use data over a longer period of time (average union density from
1950–1994) since, as suggested by Oskarsson [2002], this may be
a better indicator of labor union strength. This longer series
(again from Rama and Artecona), has the disadvantage, however,
of being available only for a small number of OECD countries.
The two-stage-least square (2SLS) estimation results for these
countries, together with OLS results, are shown in Table VI.39
As expected, Table VI shows that union density is negatively
correlated with the skill premium. With the 2SLS estimation
procedure, the effect of the skill premium on sorting is smaller for
the Mincer coefficient (2.82 versus 3.59), but it is larger for other
two measures (0.43 versus 0.27 for the wage ratio measure and
0.43 versus 0.41 for the lifetime income measure), indicating that
endogeneity is not necessarily a problem that creates an upward
bias in our estimates. These results show that the skill premium
has a large and positive effect on marital sorting. The estimate of
0.43 for the wage ratio, for example, implies that going from being
a more equal country like Germany to a more unequal country
like the United States leads to a 0.10 points increase in marital
sorting.
Another possible instrument for the skill premium is the
38. The union strength measures in Rama and Artecona [2000] are reported
by five-year intervals.
39. The results in Table VI are based on 13 countries: Australia, Belgium,
Britain, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Nor-
way, Sweden, and the United States. The mean value of union density in the
sample is about 39 percent with a standard deviation of about 16 percent.
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average years of schooling in a country, since one might expect
countries with a higher skilled share of the population (and hence
a lower skill premium according to our model) to have higher
average years of schooling. Furthermore, this is a variable that
evolves slowly over time. According to our model, this variable
would not have an effect on sorting other than through its effect
on the skill premium.
Table VII shows our 2SLS estimates of the correlation be-
tween marital sorting and three skill premium measures (the
wage ratio, the skill indicator measure, and the lifetime income
ratio).40 We use the measures of average years of schooling for the
population aged 25 and above given in Barro and Lee [2000]. In
the first-stage regressions, with or without an additional Latin
American dummy, average years of schooling is negatively and
significantly correlated with the skill premium.
40. The results in Table VII are based on 33 countries since the average years
of schooling is missing for Luxembourg. Years of schooling does not have a
significant effect on the Mincer coefficient estimates of the skill premium in the
first stage of 2SLS.
TABLE VI
IV REGRESSION OF MARITAL SORTING ON SKILL PREMIUM: UNION DENSITY
Explanatory
variable
Dependent variable—marital sorting
Skill premium measure
Wage ratio Mincer coef. Lifetime ratio
Second
stage OLS
Second
stage OLS
Second
stage OLS
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
Constant 0.128 0.105 0.305 0.250 0.143 0.103
(0.323) (0.196) (0.091)*** (0.086)** (0.294) (0.197)
Skill premium 0.426 0.269 2.822 3.591 0.431 0.405
(0.209)* (0.132)* (1.131)** (1.083)*** (0.190)** (0.133)**
First stage First stage First stage
Constant 1.689 0.102 1.703
(0.111)*** (0.009)*** (0.083)***
Total union density 0.005 0.001 0.005
(0.003)* (0.0002)*** (0.002)**
Number of obs. 13 13 13 13 13 13
Adjusted R2 0.197 0.133 0.508 0.346 0.325 0.251
Standard errors reflect Eicker-White correction for heteroskedasticity.
* Significant at 10 percent; ** Significant at 5 percent; *** Significant at 1 percent.
315LOVE AND MONEY
T
A
B
L
E
V
II
IV
R
E
G
R
E
S
S
IO
N
O
F
M
A
R
IT
A
L
S
O
R
T
IN
G
O
N
S
K
IL
L
P
R
E
M
IU
M
:
A
V
E
R
A
G
E
Y
E
A
R
S
O
F
S
C
H
O
O
L
IN
G
E
xp
la
n
at
or
y
va
ri
ab
le
D
ep
en
de
n
t
va
ri
ab
le
—
m
ar
it
al
so
rt
in
g
W
ag
e
ra
ti
o
S
ki
ll
in
di
ca
to
r
L
if
et
im
e
ra
ti
o
S
ec
on
d
st
ag
e
O
L
S
S
ec
on
d
st
ag
e
O
L
S
S
ec
on
d
st
ag
e
O
L
S
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
C
on
st
an
t
0.
33
2
0.
24
2
0.
42
3
0.
44
9
0.
40
6
0.
37
6
0.
44
9
0.
45
7
0.
37
7
0.
32
0
0.
45
3
0.
47
5
(0
.0
60
)*
**
(0
.1
80
)
(0
.0
43
)*
**
(0
.0
44
)*
**
(0
.0
46
)*
**
(0
.0
95
)*
**
(0
.0
37
)*
**
(0
.0
40
)*
*
(0
.0
55
)*
**
(0
.1
14
)*
**
(0
.0
38
)*
**
(0
.0
36
)*
**
S
ki
ll
pr
em
iu
m
0.
13
3
0.
20
2
0.
08
9
0.
06
8
0.
31
5
0.
40
6
0.
24
7
0.
22
2
0.
10
4
0.
14
9
0.
06
9
0.
05
0
(0
.0
29
)*
**
(0
.1
16
)*
(0
.0
16
)*
**
(0
.0
22
)*
**
(0
.0
64
)*
**
(0
.2
11
)*
(0
.0
43
)*
**
(0
.0
68
)*
**
(0
.0
24
)*
**
(0
.0
70
)*
*
(0
.0
12
)*
**
(0
.0
16
)*
**
L
A
du
m
m
y

0.
12
6
0.
04
3

0.
07
1
0.
01
9

0.
10
6
0.
04
8
(0
.1
55
)
(0
.0
42
)
(0
.1
14
)
(0
.0
43
)
(0
.1
08
)
(0
.0
41
)
F
ir
st
st
ag
e
F
ir
st
st
ag
e
F
ir
st
st
ag
e
C
on
st
an
t
4.
11
4
2.
71
5
1.
50
3
1.
01
7
4.
85
1
3.
15
8
(0
.3
90
)*
**
(0
.4
28
)*
**
(0
.1
37
)*
**
(0
.1
52
)*
**
(0
.4
87
)*
**
(0
.5
44
)*
**
A
ve
ra
ge
ye
ar
s
of
sc
ho
ol
in
g

0.
26
6

0.
13
3

0.
11
2

0.
06
6

0.
34
2

0.
18
1
(0
.0
49
)*
**
(0
.0
47
)*
**
(0
.0
17
)*
**
(0
.0
17
)*
**
(0
.0
60
)*
**
(0
.0
60
)*
**
L
A
du
m
m
y
0.
92
2
0.
32
0
1.
11
5
(0
.2
00
)*
**
(0
.0
71
)*
**
(0
.2
53
)*
**
N
um
be
r
of
ob
s.
33
33
33
33
33
33
33
33
33
33
33
33
A
dj
us
te
d
R
2
0.
47
7
0.
68
5
0.
38
0
0.
37
4
0.
56
9
0.
73
6
0.
44
9
0.
43
3
0.
49
2
0.
68
1
0.
36
9
0.
36
8
S
ta
n
da
rd
er
ro
rs
re
fl
ec
t
E
ic
ke
r-
W
h
it
e
co
rr
ec
ti
on
fo
r
h
et
er
os
ke
da
st
ic
it
y.
*
S
ig
n
ifi
ca
n
t
at
10
pe
rc
en
t;
**
S
ig
n
ifi
ca
n
t
at
5
pe
rc
en
t;
**
*
S
ig
n
ifi
ca
n
t
at
1
pe
rc
en
t.
316 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
In the second-stage regressions, the effect of the skill pre-
mium on marital sorting is positive and highly significant in the
specification without an LA dummy, though the significance de-
creases once the LA dummy is introduced (though the latter is not
significant in these regressions).41 The estimate of 0.315 for the
skill indicator implies that going from a more equal country like
Sweden, for example, to a more unequal one like Chile results in
an increase in the correlation coefficient for spouses’ education of
about 0.26 points. The IV regressions have larger estimates of the
effect of the skill premium on sorting than our OLS estimates,
suggesting that downward bias due to measurement error in the
skill premium might be larger than the potential reverse causal-
ity problem.42
It should be noted before concluding that a potential problem
with our instrument is that one could argue that average years of
schooling may have an independent (presumably negative) effect
on sorting by allowing people to mix for a greater amount of time
before finally separating across skill lines. This consideration
suggests that our results in Table VII should be approached with
some caution.43
III.E. Alternative Explanations
A natural concern is that our finding of a positive and signifi-
cant relationship between sorting and the skill premium is driven
by some third factor that is positively correlated with our vari-
ables. We now turn to an examination of various possible candi-
date variables that could be driving our results. We first discuss
several possibilities and then report the results of including them
in our baseline regression in Table VIII.
A possible (presumably exogenous) variable that could affect
both sorting and the skill premium is the country’s degree of
ethnic fractionalization. Some authors have argued, for example,
that greater ethnic fractionalization leads to greater inequality,
through various political economy mechanisms (see, e.g., Alesina,
Baqir, and Easterly [1999] and Easterly [2001]). This, coupled
41. Furthermore, the coefficient on the LA dummy is now negative rather
than the positive effect we had found in our baseline regressions.
42. As we discussed previously, an alternative matching model would imply
that the proportion of the population that is skilled also affects sorting. We
attempted to include this variable in our IV estimation, but as it was not signifi-
cant in the first stage of our procedure, we decided to omit this specification.
43. We thank Torsten Persson for bringing this point to our attention.
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with the fact that people tend to marry individuals within their
own ethnic group, could be responsible for our result.
We examine the above possibility by introducing a variable
that captures the degree of ethno-linguistic fractionalization
within the country. This variable, which take values between 0
and 100 with higher values indicating more fractionalization, is
taken from the World Bank Growth Network (WBGN) data set.44
For our set of countries (excluding the Czech Republic, Hungary,
Poland, and Slovakia for which data were not available, the
degree of ethno-linguistic fractionalization ranges from a mini-
mum of 3 (Germany) to a maximum of 75 (Canada) with a mean
value of 26.3 and a standard deviation of 20.8.
A different hypothesis is that the degree of urbanization may
be driving our results. Cities, it can be argued, are places where
greater mixing may occur among different types than in the
countryside, which may be characterized by a more uniform de-
gree of skill acquisition. Thus, if countries whose population is
more concentrated in cities tend to have also lower skill premi-
ums (perhaps due to better borrowing opportunities in cities), this
might be responsible for our finding of a positive correlation
between sorting and the skill premium.
To examine the hypothesis above, we introduce an urbaniza-
tion variable (which we take from the WBGN data set as well).
This variable measures the proportion of a country’s population
that in 1990 lived in urban areas, as reported to the United
Nations by each country. In our sample, the lowest value for
urbanization is 47.1 (Costa Rica), and the highest value is 96.5
(Belgium). Overall, the mean value for urbanization is 73.3, with
a standard deviation of 13.2.
A last concern is that our results are driven by the level of
GDP per capita. Although GDP per capita is an endogenous
variable in our model, and hence treating it as an exogenous
variable is problematic in the absence of a valid instrument (see
the discussion in the next section), we nonetheless add it as a
control variable in our regression where it can also be thought of
as representing that part of income that is not captured by the
variables in the model. This variable could be responsible for our
observed positive correlation if, for example, countries with low
income are more unequal (maybe due to technology or to some
44. This variable is available at http://www.worldbankorg/research/growth/
GDNdata.htm.
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political economy reason) and if not marrying “down” matters
more when income is low than when it is high.45 Thus, countries
with low levels of GDP should also see higher levels of sorting.
To evaluate the argument above, we incorporate a measure of
real per capita GDP (its 1997 value from the WBGN) into our
regression analysis. The poorest country in our sample has real
GDP per capita of $1896 (Bolivia), and the richest one has
$21,974 (Luxembourg); the average for the entire sample is
$9897, with a standard deviation of $5941.46
Table VIII reports the results of introducing each of these
variables separately in a regression of marital sorting on the skill
premium, using the wage ratio as the measure of the skill pre-
mium.47 As one might expect from our discussion above, ethnic
fractionalization has a positive and significant effect on marital
sorting. The effect of urbanization is negative, as expected, but
insignificant. Last, GDP per capita is negative and highly signifi-
cant. In each specification (both with and without the additional
control for Latin American), the coefficient on the skill premium
remains positive and significant at the 1 or 5 percent level. In
columns (7) and (8) we simultaneously include the variables that
had a significant effect on sorting in the simple regressions. The
effect of the skill premium remains positive and significant.
The results from the regressions reported above indicate that
the positive correlation between marital sorting and the skill
premium is not an artifact of some obvious third factor.
III.F. Gender Inequality and Sorting
In this subsection we analyze the relationship between gen-
der inequality and marital sorting. As we discussed in subsection
II.C, lower participation by women in the formal labor market
(due either to low wages, lower probability of employment, or
social norms that discourage women from working outside the
home) is likely to be associated with greater marital sorting. In
line with our theory, we examine how two different sets of mea-
sures that relate to how women fare across countries—gender
differences in pay and wider measures of gender inequality—
affect sorting. Columns (7)–(9) in Table I report several of our
45. This argument more generally depends on the sign of the third derivative
of the utility function.
46. The data for Germany are from 1992.
47. We obtain similar results if we use the other measures of the skill
premium.
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measures of gender equality by country. Our main results are
presented in Table IX.
The World Bank [2001a] uses both published and unpub-
lished sources to provide an estimate of a “raw gender gap,” which
is defined as female earnings or wages as a fraction of male
earnings or wages. Using the most recent available estimates for
the countries in our sample, Chile and Venezuela have the high-
est numbers (women earn relatively well), and Taiwan and Bo-
livia have the lowest.48 The sample mean is .78 with a standard
deviation of 0.09. The World Bank also provides a measure of the
“unexplained gender gap” which is the female-male earning dif-
ference adjusted for differences in education and experience. This
variable was not significant, however, and so we omit it from the
table.49
The UNDP publishes the Human Development Report 2003
which provides two alternative measures of gender inequality:
the “gender-related development index” and gross enrollment
differences in education between females and males. The gender-
related development index is constructed by adjusting the aver-
age achievement of countries on life expectancy, adult literacy
rate, combined primary, secondary, and tertiary education gross
enrollment rate, and income by the degree of gender disparities in
these dimensions.50 The second measure isolates the education
dimension used to construct the gender-related development in-
dex, i.e., the combined primary, secondary, and tertiary education
gross enrollment ratio of females to males. Both measures are
available for all the countries in our sample, except Taiwan.
Norway has the highest value for the gender development index,
and Sweden has the highest enrollment ratio, whereas Bolivia
has the lowest score in the gender-development index, and Chile
has the lowest enrollment ratio.
We also examined the effect of the percentage of the labor
48. Belgium, Finland, Luxembourg, Paraguay, and Slovakia, are not in the
sample. Furthermore, we did not include the estimates for Spain since they were
based on a study using only private sector, white-collar workers.
49. We also experimented with constructing a similar measure using our LIS
and LA data sets by regressing earnings on years of schooling, potential experi-
ence (and its squared value), and a female dummy variable. We likewise obtained
insignificant results when we used the coefficient on the female dummy in our
sorting regression. This leads us to suspect that the more relevant features of
discrimination may lie in what a woman is able to achieve rather than in her
earnings given her education.
50. A detailed description of how the gender-related development index is
calculated is provided in the technical notes section of the Human Development
Report 2003, pages 343–344.
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force that is female to see whether this variable would be able to
summarize different types of discrimination. We used 1990 num-
bers, available from the World Bank [2001b]. In this sample,
Luxembourg and Taiwan are excluded since the data were not
available. The lowest value for the fraction of labor force that is
female is 27.7 (Ecuador), and the highest is 48 (Finland and
Sweden).
As can be seen in Table IX, all measures of female status
enter negatively and significantly in explaining sorting, as pre-
dicted by our theory. Note that a higher value of the “discrimi-
nation” variable is in all cases associated with a better position
for women, i.e., earning a greater fraction of male wages, higher
female to male enrollment, and higher gender development. Only
the percentage of labor force that is female is no longer significant
once we control for Latin America. In all cases, furthermore, the
effect of the (male) skill premium remains positive and significant
at the 1 or 5 percent level. The last column in Table IX enters all
the gender-related variables that were significant on their own
(and survived the inclusion of a Latin American dummy). As can
be seen, in this specification only the gender-development index
and the skill premium remain significant.51
We also included the gender discrimination variables as a
final specification in Table VIII, omitting the LA dummy as this
variable had no explanatory power once the alternative candi-
dates were included. As can be seen, none of these variables is
significant in the larger regression (including GDP per capita),
although the skill premium remains positive and significant
(though, not surprisingly, the significance is reduced as there are
only 24 observations and 7 explanatory variables).
From this section we conclude that discrimination against
women appears to be positively and significantly related to sort-
ing, which is in line with the predictions of our model.
III.G. Per Capita Income, Skilled Population, and Sorting
We now turn to an examination of a different prediction of
our model: the existence of a negative relation between marital
sorting and per capita income across countries. Note that our
model implies that across steady states, economies with the same
technology are characterized by a positive relationship between
51. Throughout this table we used the wage ratio measure of the skill pre-
mium. We obtain similar results using the other measures.
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sorting and the skill premium and a negative relationship of
these with the proportion of skilled individuals. Consequently,
ceteris paribus, we expect economies with similar technologies
but with greater sorting to have lower per capita income as their
level of human capital will be further from the efficient level.52
We turn to an examination of this relationship in the data.53
Figure V shows the relation between marital sorting and per
capita income where per capita income is real GDP per capita in
1997. Table X reports the regression results for specifications in
which the dependent variable is the skilled proportion of the male
population in our sample (columns (1) and (2)) and per capita
52. We also attempted in a variety of ways to investigate the effect of credit
market imperfection on our results, but we found the effect to be negligible (we
thank Michael Kremer for suggesting this exercise). We think that this is likely to
be due to the fact that the various measures of credit market imperfections (e.g.,
M3/GDP, deposit money bank assets/GDP, private credits by money banks and
other financial institutions/GDP, concentration of the banking sector, overhead
costs in the banking sector, and share of foreign banks in the banking sector), are
not really able to capture how difficult it is to borrow against future human capital
nor to distinguish among different countries’ education policies which would be
the more relevant variables.
53. Note that this prediction of our model need hold only across steady states
and for countries with the same technology, unlike our other predictions which
require neither assumption.
FIGURE V
GDP per Capita and Marital Sorting
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income (columns (3) and (4)). In both cases, the explanatory
variable is marital sorting with and without a Latin American
dummy. As shown, sorting has a significant and negative effect in
each specification as predicted by our model.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
This paper has examined the relationship between marital or
household sorting and income inequality. Using a general equi-
librium model in which potentially borrowing constrained indi-
viduals make decisions over education and matching, we find that
there is a positive relationship between household sorting and
inequality. In particular, whether at a point in time, or across
steady states, economies with greater skill premiums should also
display a greater degree of sorting. Our model also predicts that
if economies have identical technologies, more sorting should be
associated with lower per capita income and a lower proportion of
skilled workers. Furthermore, in a variant of our model that
differentiates between men and women, we find that economies
with less discrimination against women should have less sorting.
Our empirical work is based on household surveys for 34
countries. From these surveys we create our main sample for each
country, a measure of marital sorting, and various measures of
TABLE X
IMPLICATIONS OF MARITAL SORTING FOR GDP PER CAPITA
AND THE PROPORTION SKILLED
Explanatory variable
Dependent variable
Proportion skilled GDP per capita
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Constant 0.513 0.466 31476.25 23978.05
(0.513)*** (0.102)*** (3396.62)*** (2628.19)***
Marital sorting 0.436 0.332 35843.56 19352.62
(0.141)*** (0.192)* (5397.69)*** (5395.02)***
LA dummy 0.04 6354.79
(0.048) (1534.31)***
Number of obs. 34 34 34 34
Adjusted R2 0.121 0.110 0.422 0.601
Standard errors reflect Eicker-White correction for heteroskedasticity.
* Significant at 10 percent; ** Significant at 5 percent; *** Significant at 1 percent.
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the skill premium. Our regression analysis supports our central
prediction of a positive relationship between sorting and inequal-
ity across countries even after controlling for other possible
sources of this correlation, such as urbanization and ethnic frac-
tionalization. We also show that our results are not driven by
GDP per capita and that less female discrimination is associated
with less sorting. Last, we also find evidence in favor of a negative
relationship between sorting and per capita income.
It should be noted that our story of greater pickiness with
respect to household partners in the face of an increased skill
premium is of course not the only one compatible with a positive
correlation between these two variables. An alternative story,
with similar mechanics, would be of greater sorting into commu-
nities or schools in response to greater inequality (say, in re-
sponse to fear of more crime). This could then lead to fewer
opportunities to interact between individuals of different skill
groups and consequently to a greater correlation of spouses in
education. We do not see this mechanism as being very different.
Once again, private decisions that are sensitive to the degree of
inequality (e.g., where to live, where to go to school) would feed
through to marital choices, which would then have important
social consequences as a result of borrowing constraints.
APPENDIX 1: AN ALTERNATIVE MODEL OF SORTING
In this alternative framework, sorting arises from the efforts
of skilled agents to segregate themselves from the rest of society.
One can think of this effort as the cost that a skilled agent is
willing to bear in order to live in a more segregated neighborhood,
attend a more segregated school, or belong to a more exclusive
social club. A simple way to model this is to assume that each
skilled agent chooses an effort level e. This effort results in a
probability p(e) of being perfectly segregated and thereby obtain-
ing a match with another skilled agent for sure, and a probability
1  p(e) of not being able to segregate and hence obtaining a
match at random. The benefit associated with segregation is that
the skilled agent obtains u(Iss), whereas otherwise the agent
obtains a random draw with expected utility given by ˆu(Iss) 
(1  ˆ)u(Isu), where ˆ is the proportion of skilled agents in the
nonsegregated (i.e., random matching) pool. The cost of making
an effort to segregate is c(e), where c(e) is an increasing, continu-
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ous, convex twice-differentiable cost function with c(0)  0. To
simplify, we assume that all matches end in marriages.
A skilled agent chooses e to maximize
(19) peuIss 1 peˆuIss 1 ˆuIsu ce,
taken as given the (simultaneous) effort levels of all other skilled
agents and thus ˆ. We assume that p(e) is an increasing, concave,
continuous, twice-differentiable function with p(0)  0, lime3
p(e)  1, and that it satisfies the Inada conditions thus ensuring
an interior solution.
The first- and second-order conditions associated with this
maximization problem are, respectively,
(20) pe1  ˆuIss  uIsu  ce  0
and
(21) pe1  ˆuIss  uIsu  ce  0.
Equation (20) defines a relationship e*(ˆ). Note that e* is de-
creasing in ˆ: the greater the proportion of skilled agents in the
nonsegregated population, the less effort a skilled agent will
make to segregate. This is a source of potential multiple equilib-
ria since if other skilled agents are making a larger (smaller)
effort to segregate, an individual skilled agent will likewise find it
optimal to make a larger (smaller) effort as well. Note that since
all skilled agents face the same marginal cost and benefit deci-
sion, they will all choose the same level of e in equilibrium.54
ˆ is a function both of the proportion of skilled agents, , and
of the effort that these make to segregate themselves. We can
write ˆ as
(22) ˆ 
1  pe
1  pe  1   
1  pe
1  pe
since if skilled agents choose effort level e this will result in a
54. Alternatively, we could assume that skilled agents can segregate with
probability one, but that they face heterogeneous costs in doing so. Thus, the
greater the benefit from segregation, the larger is the cost the marginal skilled
agent is willing to bear to do so, and thus the larger is the proportion of skilled
agents that choose to segregate. As before, this can generate multiple equilibria
since the relative benefit of segregation is increasing in the number of skilled
agents who do so, as this decreases the proportion of skilled agents in the random
sorting pool.
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measure p(e) of them segregating and leave 1  p(e) of them to
be matched randomly in a population of (1  p(e))  (1  ) 
1  p(e) agents. Equation (22) defines a relationship ˆ(e; ).
Note that ˆ is a decreasing function of e.
Figure VI depicts equilibrium in this model as the intersec-
tion of two loci, for a given . The e*(ˆ) locus gives the value of e
that an individual skilled agent would choose if she expected the
probability of being matched at random with another skilled
agent to be ˆ. The LL locus depicts the values of e and ˆ that
satisfy equation (22) for a given . Note that, as shown in the
figure, there may be multiple equilibria. We will focus only on
those equilibria that are locally stable such as point A or C in
Figure VI. Point B is not locally stable since an increase in the
effort of a small measure of skilled agents would lead to a suffi-
ciently large decline in ˆ that, faced with that new level of ˆ,
agents would now choose an even greater level of effort.
More formally, for an equilibrium to be locally stable, the
slope of the e*(ˆ) curve must be greater than the slope of the LL
curve; i.e.,
(23) S   p1  uIss  uIsu  1  pc
 p2
1  
1  p uIss  uIsu  0.
Note that a stable equilibrium always exists since whereas the
LL curve intersects the ˆ axis at ˆ   and asymptotes to infinity
on the e axis, the e*(ˆ) curve intersects the ˆ axis at ˆ  1 and
meets the e axis at some finite value, e*(0).
FIGURE VI
Equilibrium Determination of ˆ
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Given a proportion t of skilled agents at time t, the equilib-
rium distribution of households is given by
(24) 
ijt  	 pe*t
t
21  pe*2
1  pe*t
, if ij ss
2t1 t1 pe*
1 pe*t
, if ij su
1 t2
1 pe*t
, if ij uu.
LEMMA A1. The correlation of spouses in skill type is given by
p(e*)(1  )/(1  p(e*)).
Proof of Lemma A1. As in the proof of Lemma 1, let X be the
random variable associated with the skill distribution of women
(i.e., x  1 if x  s, and x  0 if x  u), and let Y be the random
variable associated with the skill distribution of men. Solving for
the correlation 
 yields 
  p(e*)(1  )/(1  p(e*)).
Note that, unlike the previous model of sorting, the propor-
tion of skilled agents in the economy directly affects the correla-
tion coefficient. Nonetheless, it is easy to show that, in this model
as well, an increase in inequality will increase the amount of
sorting. As before, we first examine the consequences of an exoge-
nous increase in the skill premium and then analyze the effect of
a change in .
THEOREM A1. An increase in the skill premium, ws/wu, increases
marital sorting.
Proof of Theorem A1. Totally differentiating e* with respect
to ws (using (20) and (22)) yields
de*
dws
 
p1 1 p
S 2uIss uIsu 0,
which is positive by A1 and the stability condition (23). Similarly,
de*
dwu

p1  1  p
S uIsu  0.
Recalling that 
  p(e*)(1  )/(1  p(e*)), and hence that

/e*  0, it follows that sorting is increasing in the skill
premium.
Thus, in this alternative model, as in the previous one, an
increase in inequality between skilled and unskilled agents
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causes the former to form a greater proportion of households with
their own type, thereby increasing the degree of marital sorting in
the economy. In terms of Figure VI, an increase in the skill
premium shifts out the e* locus, causing any stable equilibrium to
be characterized by a higher e and a lower ˆ.
COROLLARY A1. A decrease in  increases marital sorting.
Proof of Corollary A1. Note that 
/  p(e*)(1  p(e*))/
(1  p)2  0 and that e*/  0. Furthermore, dw˜s/d  0,
and dwu/d  0. Totally differentiating 
, it then follows directly
from the theorem above that a decrease in  increases sorting.
The intuition for the result above is clear. A decrease in 
increases the effort that skilled agents make to segregate them-
selves both because a lower  increases inequality and because it
directly decreases the probability that random matching will
result in contact with another skilled agent. In terms of Figure
VI, the decrease in  not only shifts out the e* locus as before due
to the increase in the skill premium, but it also shifts in the LL
locus due to the decrease in ˆ. The combined effect of these two
shifts on any locally stable equilibrium is to increase e and de-
crease ˆ.
APPENDIX 2: SORTING AND GENDER
Proof of Proposition 1. Note that 1    1  wfs/wms.
Hence, to show q*fs  q˜*fs, it is sufficient to show that (wms  wfs)
ln ((wms  wfs)/(wmu  wfs))  wms ln (wms/wmu). Noting that
the expression on the right-hand side of the inequality is the same
as the one on the left-hand side but with wfs set to zero, we can
prove the inequality by showing that (wms  wfs) ln ((wms 
wfs)/(wmu  wfs)) is decreasing in wfs. Let (wms  wfs) ln
((wms  wfs)/(wmu  wfs))/wfs  ln ((wms  wfs)/(wmu 
wfs))  (wmu  wms)/(wmu  wfs)  z(wms, wmu, wfs). To show
that this expression is negative, note that it is decreasing in wms
(i.e.,  z/wms  (wmu  wms)/(wmu  wfs)(wms  wfs)  0). Also
note that wms  wmu. Thus, evaluating z, at wms  wmu, yields
z  0, and hence q*fs  q˜*fs.
Simulation Results
Let m be the fraction of skilled males and f be the fraction
of skilled females in the population. If tj  0, after substituting
equation (15) into equation (13), the value of being married be-
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tween a type-i male and a type-j female with match quality q is
given by
Vij q  ln wmi wfj  wmi1    ln  1  wfj wmiwfj j q,
whereas for tj  0 it is given by
Vij q  ln wmi  ln j q.
Consider the first round of matching, and let q*f,ij be the
threshold match quality level for a type-j female matched with a
type-i male, and q*m,ij be the reservation quality for a type-i male
matched with a type-j female.
The equilibrium distribution of matches in the first round is
thus given by
˜ij 	
mf1  Qq*f,ss1  Qq*m,ss, if ij ss
1 m1 f1Qq*f,uu1Qq*m,uu, if ij uu
m1 f1Qq*f,su1Qq*m,su, if ij su
f1 m1Qq*f,us1Qq*m,us, if ij us.
This implies that in the second round, the new proportion of
skilled males and females is given by
m
m ˜ss ˜su
1  ˜ss ˜uu ˜su ˜us
and
f
f ˜ss ˜us
1  ˜ss ˜uu ˜su ˜us
.
Therefore, the equilibrium distribution of households is finally
given by
ij
 	
˜ss mf1  ˜ss ˜uu ˜su ˜us, if ij ss
˜uu  1 m1 f1 ˜ss  ˜uu  ˜su  ˜us, if ij uu
˜su  m1 f1 ˜ss  ˜uu  ˜su  ˜us, if ij su
˜us  1 mf1 ˜ss  ˜uu  ˜su  ˜us, if ij us.
This yields a correlation between husbands’ and wives’ skill types
of
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 
ss mf

m1  m 
f1  f

˜ss mf 1  ˜ss ˜uu ˜su ˜us  mf

m1  m 
f 1  f .
We can now solve for the reservation qualities of each gender-
type as
q*f,ij 	
	  Vss Vus1  m, if ij ss,
	 Vuu  Vsum, if ij uu,
	 Vsu  Vuu1 m, if ij su,
	 Vus  Vssm, if ij us,
for females; and as
q*m,ij 	
	  Vss Vsu1  f, if ij ss,
	 Vuu  Vusf, if ij uu,
	 Vsu  Vssf, if ij su,
	 Vsu  Vuu1 f, if ij us,
for males.
Note that q*s are functions of m and f. Hence, an equi-
librium is a fixed point of q*s and m and f. The exercise now
is to compare two societies. In the first, women choose tj freely. In
the second society, women have tj  0 (either because of social
norms or because wfj  wm,i), and show that there is less
sorting when women work.
In Tables XI and XII we report results from two sets of
TABLE XI
s  1.5 s  2.0 s  2.5
Work No work Work No work Work No work

 0.0990 0.1109 0.1216 0.1369 0.1382 0.1562
q*f,ss 0.7008 0.6007 0.6989 0.5979 0.6976 0.5957
q*f,su 0.6496 0.6007 0.6475 0.5979 0.6458 0.5957
q*f,us 1.0718 1.0905 1.0699 1.0877 1.0685 1.0855
q*f,uu 1.0840 1.0905 1.0819 1.0877 1.0803 1.0855
q*m,ss 0.8429 0.8760 0.7494 0.7834 0.6748 0.7093
q*m,su 1.0335 1.0277 1.0476 1.0429 1.0566 1.0523
q*m,us 0.7906 0.8760 0.6961 0.7834 0.6208 0.7093
q*m,uu 1.0446 1.0277 1.0578 1.0429 1.0660 1.0523
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simulations. In both cases Q is the cumulative of a triangular
probability distribution with q  2 and 	  1. We also set u 
1 and wfu  1 in both cases. Table XI shows results when the rest
of the parameters are set to their average values in our LIS
sample. In particular, we set m  0.282, f  0.248, wfs 
1.427, wmu  1.455, and wms  2.331. Given the wage levels,
we set   0.3743, which implies that a skilled female who is
matched with another skilled male works about 0.3 of her one
unit time in the market. In Table XII we set the proportion of
skilled individuals and the skill premium to their average values
in our LA sample (m  0.199, f  0.161, wfs  1.335, wmu 
2.495, and wms  3.992), and following the same procedure as in
Table XI choose   0.3684.55
Results in Tables XI and XII provide further support for the
positive link between gender discrimination and sorting that we
established in subsection II.C and documented empirically in
subsection III.F. In both tables skilled females who are matches
with unskilled females are more picky (i.e., q*f,us values are
higher) and sorting is higher when women are not allowed to
work.
We obtained results similar to the above for a wide range of
parameter values. It is not, of course, impossible to generate the
55. Since there are only two rounds of random matching, the correlation
coefficients in Tables XI and XII are quite a bit lower than the ones in the data.
Although adding more rounds of random matching will improve the match of the
simulations in this dimension, this would unnecessarily complicate things with-
out adding to the analysis.
TABLE XII
s  1.5 s  2 s  2.5
Work No work Work No work Work No work

 0.1924 0.2034 0.2297 0.2426 0.2562 0.2708
q*f,ss 0.3432 0.0003 0.3383 0.0079 0.3342 0.0141
q*f,su 0.0701 0.0003 0.0631 0.0079 0.0573 0.0141
q*f,us 1.0643 1.0950 1.0593 1.0874 1.0552 1.0812
q*f,uu 1.0910 1.0950 1.0840 1.0874 1.0781 1.0812
q*m,ss 0.8246 0.8648 0.7227 0.7649 0.6421 0.6854
q*m,su 1.0144 1.0141 1.0185 1.0203 1.0201 1.0229
q*m,us 0.5474 0.8648 0.4416 0.7649 0.3582 0.6854
q*m,uu 1.0371 1.0141 1.0373 1.0203 1.0361 1.0229
333LOVE AND MONEY
opposite conclusion. For this to happen, children must not matter
very much (i.e.,  is low), the skill premium for women, wfs/wfu
should be high, and the difference in child quality from a skilled
relative to an unskilled woman should be small (i.e., s/u close to
one). This implies that, in an economy in which women work
freely, they will work a great deal, and the differences in female
earnings by skill level will be high. Hence skilled men in this
economy will be very picky, and sorting will be high. If women are
not able to work, on the other hand, since men do not care much
about the difference in child quality (which in any case is small),
skilled men will not care very much whether they marry a skilled
or an unskilled woman. This indifference can be sufficiently pow-
erful so as to undo the greater pickiness of skilled women in this
economy.56 We think that our examples in which the greater
pickiness of skilled women drive the result of greater sorting are
perhaps more realistic, though a full-scale calibration is beyond
the range of this paper.
APPENDIX 3: UNIQUENESS OF EQUILIBRIUM
Note first that an increase in w˜s makes it more attractive to
be a skilled agent since it increases the direct return to being
skilled. It also makes skilled agents less likely to want to form a
household with an unskilled agent; i.e., it increases q*. An in-
crease in w˜s, on the other hand, has ambiguous effects on an
unskilled agent’s payoff since although it increases the value of
being in a household with a skilled worker, it also makes these
matches more unlikely:
(25)
d*
dw˜s

dVs Vu
dw˜s
  1 Qq*
Vss
w˜s
 1Qq*1 2
Vsu
w˜s

dq*1
dw˜s
Vuu	 Vsuq*Qq* 0,
which is strictly positive as Vss/w˜s  2u(2w˜s)  Vsu/ws 
u(w˜s  wu),   (1  )Q(q*)  (1  Q(q*))(1  2),
56. For example,   0.1, wum  wuf  1, wsm  wsf  2, s  1.2, u 
1, q  2, m  f  .3 result in greater sorting if women cannot work than if they
can freely choose the amount they wish to work (
  .082 if women work as
compared with 
  .073 if they do not work).
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dq*/dws  0 and Vuu(	)  Vsu(q*)  u(2wu)  u(2w˜s)  0
(with the latter following from the fact that skilled workers
choose a higher cutoff quality level in their matches with un-
skilled individuals than what the latter find optimal).57
An increase in wu, on the other hand, has a negative effect on
the relative desirability of being a skilled agent as
(26)
d*
dwu
 1Qq*1 2
Vsu
wu
 1  Qq*
Vuu
wu

dq*
dwu
Vsuq* Vuu	Qq* 0
is strictly negative, since both the expression on the first line,
which can be written as [(1  Q(q*))(1  2)]u(w˜s  wu) 
[1    Q(q*)]2u(2wu), and the one in the second line, which
can be written as dq*/dwu[u(2w˜s)  u(2wu)]Q(q*), are
negative.
A change in t1 has two effects: (i) it changes wages and
hence household incomes; (ii) it changes the probability
with which an agent encounters skilled and unskilled agents
in the first round of matching. The total effect on the pay-
off differential * between skilled and unskilled agents is given
by
(27)
d*t1
dt1

Vs Vu
w˜s
dw˜s
dt1

Vs Vu
wu
dwu
dt1

*t1
t1
.
Note that we can rewrite * as
*  Vss	Q	  
	
q
Vssx dQx
 
q*
q
Vsux dQx Vuu	Qq*
57. For notational convenience, we have suppressed everywhere the depen-
dence of Vij on .
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 1 Vss	Qq* 
q*
q
Vsux dQx Vuu	Q	
 
	
q
Vuux dQx,
which after substituting in (1) and (3) yields
*  u2w˜s  1  Qq*  u2wu1    Qq*
 2 1 
	
q*
x 	 dQx 2 11Qq*uw˜s wu.
Taking the derivative of * with respect to  yields (after
some manipulation)
(28)
d*
d 
dk
d u2w˜s2f k  1  Qq*  u2wu2f kk
 1 1Qq* uw˜s wu f k1 k
 2 11Qq* Q
q*

u2w˜s u2wu
 u2w˜s u2wu 2uw˜s wu1Qq*
 2 
	
q*
x 	 dQx.
In order to sign d*/d, note that the sign of the expression in the
first brace of (28) is negative. The expression in the third line is
negative, since q*/  0 and the expression multiplying it is
positive. The expression in the fourth line is also negative, if u is
concave. The term in the last line, however, is strictly positive,
i.e., !	
q* ( x  	)dQ( x)  0, which makes the sign of the entire
expression ambiguous.
APPENDIX 4: DATA
Table XIII reports the years of the households surveys used
in our empirical study. All surveys are nationally representative
samples, except for Argentina and Uruguay for which we have
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only urban samples (70 percent of the population for Argentina
and 90 percent for Uruguay). The income in the Latin American
countries is gross monthly labor income from all sources. This
definition includes income from both primary and secondary labor
activities; the exact components vary somewhat across countries,
but generally include wages, income from self-employment, and
proprietor’s income, as well as adjustment to reflect imputation of
nonmonetary income. Some LIS countries report gross annual
earnings and income, and some report these net of taxes.58 We
use gross labor earnings for LIS countries whenever it is avail-
able. The gross earnings measure for LIS countries include all
forms of cash wage and salary income, including employer bo-
nuses, thirteenth month bonus, etc. (gross of employee social
insurance contributions/taxes but net of employer social insur-
ance contributions/taxes). While most countries report gross
earnings, the following countries report only net earnings: Bel-
gium, France, Hungary, Italy, Luxembourg, Poland, and Spain.
Since taxation tends to be progressive in the countries we are
comparing, inequality of income is likely to be higher than re-
ported in those countries for which pretax income is not reported.
For most Latin American countries we have both total years
of schooling as well as highest level of educational attainments.
The only country for which we do not have levels of educational
attainment is Costa Rica, while Brazil, Paraguay, and Peru do
not report years. We define as skilled all agents who went beyond
high school education. When years of education is not reported,
this indicator is constructed using the standard age-grade pro-
gression for that country. For Britain we would have preferred to
define as skilled any individual with at least 2A levels passes (as
in Ferna´ndez [2001] or Pissarides [1982]), but as the data did not
permit us to distinguish among individuals with different num-
bers of A levels, we instead categorized them all as unskilled. Our
results are robust to categorizing them all as skilled instead.
Table XIV reports our mapping of education measures into years
of schooling and into an indicator for high school completions. For
most countries we were able to compare the percentage of adults
with education beyond the high-school level with published
58. Some LIS countries are excluded because they do not report all of the
variables required for the analysis. Ireland and Austria do not report individual
labor income. Ireland also does not report the education of the spouse in the
household sample. Education variables are not available for Switzerland.
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TABLE XIV
EDUCATION THRESHOLDS
Country
Years of schooling beyond
which a person qualifies
as skilled
The LIS education level beyond
which a person qualifies
as skilled
Australia 12 Basic/skilled vocational
qualification
Argentina 12 N/A
Belgium 12 2nd level upper professional/
technical/general; other 2nd
level upper
Bolivia 12 N/A
Brazil 11 N/A
Britain 13 A Level
Canada 12 Grade 11–13; high school grad.
Chile 11 N/A
Colombia 11 N/A
Costa Rica 11 N/A
Czech Republic 12 Secondary general/professional
Denmark 10 Level 2, 2nd stage
Ecuador 12 N/A
Finland* 12 N/A
France 12 Second stage of secondary
Germany 10 Secondary
Hungary 12 Secondary
Israel* 12 N/A
Italy 12 High school
Luxembourg 12 Higher secondary education
Mexico 12 N/A
Netherlands 12 Secondary higher
Norway* 12 N/A
Panama 12 N/A
Paraguay 12 N/A
Peru 11 N/A
Poland 12 Complete secondary
Slovakia 12 Secondary/secondary special/
skilled with leaving exam
Spain 12 Secondary education/basic tech.
edu.
Sweden 12 Secondary school
Taiwan 10, 12 Senior high/vocational
graduate
Uruguay 11 N/A
United States 12 High school diploma
Venezuela 11 N/A
* Finland, Israel, and Norway report years of education.
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sources, and to reconcile our statistics with the previously pub-
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